DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 151 989 EA 010 510

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TITLE School Board Elections and Board Responsiveness: A Case Study of the Effects of Electoral Conflict and Competition for Office.
PUB DATE Mar 78
NOTE 23p.; Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Asscciation (Toronto, Ontario, March 27-31, 1978)

EDRS PRICE MF-$0.83 HC-$1.67 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS Board Administrator Relationship; *Board Candidates; *Boards of Education; *Case Studies; Community Characteristics; *Conflict; *Educational Research; *Elections; Elementary Secondary Education; School Community Relationship; School Districts; School Superintendents; Voting

ABSTRACT

This case study examined the recent history of a southwestern school district of approximately 80,000 students and its 1977 school board election. The results of the study provide evidence supporting the theory linking the complexity of a school district with electoral competition and with open conflict on the board and between the board and the superintendent. The two board members elected in 1977 formed a majority with the dissident board member, and the superintendent resigned as the board made policy changes. Conflict and competition helped the winning candidates resist socialization pressures and maintain an independent posture, since they believed that they had a mandate from the entire community, not just from specific constituencies. It appears that the relationships identified in political theory may not necessarily represent democratic influence on policy formation at the school board level. (Author)

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# SCHOOL BOARD ELECTIONS AND BOARD RESPONSIVENESS: A CASE STUDY OF THE EFFECTS OF ELECTORAL CONFLICT AND COMPETITION FOR OFFICE

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## INTRODUCTION

This study was designed within the framework of a body of research which demonstrates that aspects of school board behavior can be predicted by characteristics of the school district and by the nature of the election process.[1] Those findings can be linked into a testable theory. The study reported here was conducted to apply that theory to understand events in a specific community and to illuminate a part of that theory--the effect of electoral competition and conflict on the role new board members assume.

## BACKGROUND

Several studies have shown that school board decision making styles can be explained by community and electoral variables. School district characteristics of complexity[2] and socio-economic level[3] have been linked to electoral competition, electoral conflict, and aspects of school board behavior. Elements of this research can be combined to form a testable theory which links district characteristics to electoral competition and conflict and, both directly and indirectly, to school board behavior.

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INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE

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District complexity is directly associated with electoral competition, electoral conflict and board responsiveness. Zeigler and

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
DISTRICT CHARACTERISTICS
ELECTORAL VARIABLES
BOARD'S DECISION MAKING STYLE
Electoral Competition and Conflict
Social and Economic Complexity
Socio-Economic Status
1. Board Responsiveness
2. Board Receptivity to Public Participation
3. Conflict Between Board and Superintendent

FIGURE 1

Jennings found that school boards in the United States Census Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs) are more likely to be responsive to groups, less likely to be responsive to individuals, and more often in conflict with the superintendent than are school boards in smaller, less complex districts.[4] Minar reported that boards in high socio-economic status districts are less often in conflict with the superintendent than are boards in low SES districts.[5]

Electoral competition and conflict appear as intervening variables between district characteristics and board behavior. Cistone showed electoral competition and conflict to be more prevalent in urban/heterogeneous districts than in rural/homogeneous districts.[6] Zeigler and Jennings[7] and Stelzer[8] reported a positive relationship between electoral competition and board-superintendent conflict. Stelzer also found that electoral competition was positively associated with board members' receptivity to citizen participation in board deliberations. Zeigler and Jennings reported a weak positive relationship between electoral factors which foster competition for office and board responsiveness to groups.[9]

Iannaccone and Lutz and researchers testing their theory perceive the electoral process as an effective mechanism for producing policy changes which reflect the electorate's values. They indicate that when a community experiences social changes from in-migration[10] or out-migration[11] its values may diverge from those of the closed system of the school board and its administration. When this occurs insurgents may provide new political leadership and force open that closed system by challenging and defeating incumbents. Conflict on the board will increase until the insurgents can form a majority. The new board will re-

place the superintendent with an outsider given a mandate to initiate policy changes. This theory assumes that the election process allows voters to affect policy making.

Kerr argued that electoral variables which diminish electoral conflict help to explain superintendent dominance of school boards.[12] While Zeigler and Jennings found only a weak association between competition for office and board responsiveness to groups, their confidence in democratic processes led them to state that "tinkering with the legal framework" to increase competition for office would, over time, increase board accountability, and thus responsiveness, to the electorate.[13]

Voters in school financial referenda have a more direct voice in a specific policy decision. Research on such elections shows that conflict, as evidenced by individual criticism and organized opposition to a bond issue, changes both the size and the composition of the "normal" electorate by activating the typically uninvolved citizen.[14]

Thus an extensive body of literature indicates that electoral conditions are important intervening variables explaining the relationship between community characteristics and school board behavior. Consistent with classic democratic theory, it suggests that competition for office and conflict over issues increases voter participation. Broader participation promotes the election of board members who represent the will of the community to the school administration. Conversely, a lack of competition and conflict allows the superintendent to dominate the board so that it serves to legitimate administrative policy to the community.

When applied to a specific case, the theory developed from this research would lead to several predictions. For example, community conflict over school-related issues and board actions and candidates who chal-

lenge the board's policies and decision making processes might be evidence of an insurgent group's attempt to gain influence. It would also predict that these conditions would have the effect of stimulating the interest of citizens who usually ignore school politics and, thus, would affect turnout. The election of challengers would be evidence either of the strength of the insurgents or of the dissatisfaction of the newly involved voter. Election of the challengers would produce intra-board and board-superintendent conflict which could lead to a change in superintendents and a change in policies.

## THE 1977 SCHOOL BOARD ELECTION

This case study attempted to apply the theory described above to a specific election. The recent history of the school system under investigation makes a case study of its 1977 school board election of relevance for the development of a theory of elections and board behavior. The school district of approximately 80,000 students is located in the southwestern United States, an area which has experienced major population increases. The heterogeneous district encompasses the only SMSA in the state and includes rural, suburban and inner city populations. In the 1977 election voters filled two at-large positions on the board of education and approved a tax increase to support the city's technical-vocational school.

In the past, the city's board elections have attracted many candidates but few divisive issues. Incumbents choosing to run have always been re-elected. Voters have never defeated a school bond issue. Although disagreements between the school administration and parts of the community occur regularly, the legitimacy of the decision making process had never

been challenged seriously until the months preceding the 1977 election. Then a confluence of separate issues appeared to threaten the system's stability.

The six months before the election had seen a strong campaign to recall four of the five board members. While enough signatures for the election were collected, legal technicalities prevented their verification, and no recall election was held.

The system's teachers were working without a master contract after a negotiations deadlock and a failed strike vote. This condition worried many teachers who expressed fear of what the administration might do. The teachers' bargaining unit blamed the board for the problem. A wildcat strike supported by a majority of the system's blue collar workers left a residue of bitterness, not only among those employees but among other low income Chicanos and Chicano high school and college students. These groups demonstrated, picketed board meetings, and even disrupted board meetings.

In the 1975 election a heavy snowstorm had depressed turnout in a large part of the city. As a result, a dissident with support in low income Hispanic precincts unaffected by the weather was elected. Since an incumbent running for reelection also won with a large majority in all areas of the city, her election did not appear to represent a shift in community attitudes toward the school system. The new board member shattered the traditional public consensus long characteristic of the board. She publicly challenged both administrative decisions and the procedures used to make them. Overflow crowds attended board meetings, and angry exchanges between board members often were featured on the evening news.

These controversies, especially as they focused on the recall movement, alarmed the school system's supporters. Many expressed fears that the conflict would "split the community." Board members held a series of private meetings with teachers to explain their decisions, and supporters of the board held community meetings to organize against the recall. The two incumbents chose not to seek reelection.[15] Seven candidates sought one at-large position, and sixteen sought the other.

The campaign raised strongly contested issues. Attention focused on two sets of candidates, one backed by board incumbents and the system's administration, the other supported by various groups who opposed the educational "establishment." The dissident candidates raised issues of *de facto* segregation and professional rather than lay control of educational decision making. Though public debate did not focus on ethnic issues, some supporters of the system privately cited fears of a minority "takeover" of education in the state. One of the candidates backed by the board and administration was jokingly nicknamed (by his supporters) "the great white hope."

The "establishment candidates won easily. Both were involved actively in the community's voluntary organizations from which board members usually emerge. One candidate received twice the votes of his nearest competitor. The other received nearly 40% more votes than the total cast for all her opponents. Out of 85 precincts, one candidate carried 64 and tied one, while the other carried 76 and tied one. The winning candidates received sizable minorities in many of the precincts they lost. The board incumbents and the school system's administration interpreted the results as a vindication of their past policies and procedures.

However, the new board members surprised their supporters. Joining with the dissident to form a 3-2 majority, they pressed for a different relationship with the administration. Soon they were accused of interfering in the day-to-day operation of the school system and of confusing "policy making" with "administration." Within three months of the election the superintendent had resigned.

## METHODS AND DATA SOURCES

Data for this study was collected as part of longitudinal research on change in the school district. Both quantitative and qualitative data were collected.

Graduate students gave questionnaires to voters leaving the polls at 13 polling places. The sites were selected to be representative of the district's ethnic and income distribution. Because of student job commitments questionnaires were distributed in the late afternoon. This may have skewed the sample toward those who are employed and less likely to vote during working hours. One hundred and thirty-one voters returned usable questionnaires. To encourage responses, the instruments were limited to one page. They sought information about voter demographic characteristics, participation in community activities, sources of information about candidates and issues, sources of influence on the voting decision, and issues considered important in the election.

To verify the demographic data from questionnaires an analysis of voting results by precincts was also done. An earlier study of voter participation in the district's 1968 and 1969 school financial referenda[16] provided a basis of comparison.

A content analysis of candidate speeches at a public meeting was made. The author interviewed participants in the controversy preceding the

election, attended meetings of involved groups, and attended public meetings where candidates presented their views.

## FINDINGS

Because comparative data for hypothesis testing was not available, research questions suggested by the theory described above rather than testable propositions were raised. The initial question was: Did the intense conflict and competition have the predicted effect of changing voter turnout?

The data show that conflict did not disrupt the "normal" pattern of voting in the community's school elections. The electorate was neither quantitatively nor qualitatively different from that in past school elections. Only 14.5% of the 178,000 registered voted, a marginal over the 13.2% who had voted in the 1973 election. (The 1975 election was not used as a basis of comparison because weather conditions created an atypical condition and prevented a large area of the city from voting.) Despite the city's growth, the absolute number of voters was roughly 2,000 less than the turnout in a bond referendum held five years earlier.

Qualitatively, the electorate retained the characteristics Hatley described in the city and others have found typical of school referenda nationally.[16] Their responses to the questionnaires showed that the sampled voters were predominatly middle income citizens with a direct interest in schools. Table 1 shows voter responses to two items used as measures of socio-economic status--occupation and level of education.

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INSERT TABLE 1 HERE

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Analysis of voting rates by precinct supports the questionnaire results. While turnout averaged 14.5% of the registered voters for the total

TABLE 1

SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS
N=131

| Item | Percent |
|---|---|
| **A. Occupation** | |
| Teacher | 24.4 |
| School Administrator | 1.5 |
| Retired Teacher | 3.8 |
| Retired (other) | 6.9 |
| Housewife | 15.3 |
| Student | 10.7 |
| White Collar | 18.3 |
| Professional | 8.4 |
| Blue Collar | 6.1 |
| Other | 4.6 |
| **B. Level of Education** | |
| Less than High School | 3.8 |
| High School Only | 11.5 |
| Less than 4 Years College | 22.9 |
| Bachelors Degree Only | 14.5 |
| Post Graduate Degrees or Hours | 44.3 |
| No Response | 3.1 |

district, it was consistently below the mean (7.7% in the precinct with the lowest turnout) in low SES precincts and above the mean (27.7% in the precinct with highest turnout) in the higher SES precincts.

New voters comprise less than one-fourth of the sample. Those under the age of thirty account for the majority of those who had not voted in past school elections. All others had voted in at least one of the past two school board or bond elections, and 58% had voted in both sets of elections.

Respondent reports of occupation and participation in community affairs show a pattern of involvement fitting Dahl's pluralist model of community power.[17] In pluralist communities, participation in decision making tends to be determined by the nature of the decision area. A relatively stable minority of citizens is involved in any area. A large proportion of that minority is involved because of its direct interest in the area derived from roles as employees or recipients of services. Those holding formal positions--administrators and elected officials--exert most influence. The entire community rarely is interested in a particular issue area.

Teachers and parents form the majority of this sample. Thirty percent of the sample are teachers, administrators or retired teachers. Teachers alone accounted for 24% of the sample. An additional 11% of the sample reported the spouse's occupation as teacher. Forty-six percent reported having children in the public schools, while only 37% of the city's total population have children in the public school system.[18]

Participation in educational politics appears to be concentrated in a social system of individuals linked by activity in formal, school-related bodies such as the PTA, civic organizations which include educa-

tion among their interests, and professionals employed in education. Nearly 40% of the respondents are active in the PTA or other parent-school organizations. Roughly 12% are active in either the local NEA affiliate or the teachers' union. Eight percent of the total sample consider themselves active members of the Chamber of Commerce, and 15% are active in other service organizations.

Teachers are involved in all areas of this network. A larger percentage of teachers (69%) than of any other group in the sample is active in parent-school organizations. While some teachers without children are active, the questionnaire data suggest that many teachers play a dual role in parent-teacher groups. In their own schools they represent the organization. In their children's schools they are parents with an "insider's" knowledge of the school system and of educational issues in general. Smaller percentages of teachers also are active in other community organizations. As members of these bodies they serve as linkages between teachers and members of other groups.

Teachers were more likely than members of other occupational groups to seek information from all sources about the election and the candidates. While teachers sought information from many sources, they were not correspondingly susceptible to those potential sources of influence. Of all occupational groups in the sample, only students and blue collar workers were less likely to state that their votes were influenced by newspaper endorsements. Only blue collar workers were less likely to state that their votes were influenced by recommendations from knowledgeable acquaintances. The impact of recommendations from knowledgeable acquaintances is of special interest For members of most occupational groups, such recommendations were the most important influence on the voting decision.

Teachers may be the "knowledgeable acquaintances" for many other voters. Those who participate in other organizations may play the role of opinion leaders for educational issues.

Clearly the high degree of conflict and competition in the election did not have the predicted effect of increasing turnout and involving large numbers of new voters. While conflict over issues appeared intense, it aroused those who were already participating in the educational social network as teachers, PTA members, community volunteers, and holders of official, school-related positions. Those candidates and their supporters who attempted to activate the typically uninvolved citizen were unsuccessful. Critics failed to force open the system by placing their own candidates on the board.

Competition and conflict had little effect on turnout or on the choice of winning candidates. When the new board members joined the dissident to form a majority and entered into public debate with the board minority and the school administration, the election was reexamined. The second research question became: What other electoral factors or other variables supported the new board members' independence?

Campaign issues shaped the new board's behavior, though in an unexpected way. A content analysis of campaign speeches showed three issues to be prominent in the election. The need to end community conflict over the school system, the board's responsiveness, and the cost-benefit ratio of the system's large administrative staff were debated at length. After the election, the winning candidates responded directly to those issues.

The "responsiveness" issue had dominated the campaign. Many candidates addressed the issue of the school board's lack of responsiveness. However, the term's connotations varied. The recall advocates and pro-

minent members of the teachers' association argued that the board could not be responsive to community needs because it was the superintendent's puppet. Others felt that the board meeting format, which limited audience participation, indicated a lack of responsiveness. Still others perceived it in terms of public relations and improving board-community communications. The system's critics focused on a definition of responsiveness as acting in accord with the expressed wishes of community groups, while its supporters focused on the public relations task of better communicating the rationale for board decisions to the community.

During the campaign the winning candidates initially appeared to accept the second definition. They did not commit themselves to specific policies, but they did promise to hold a series of public meetings to get public "input" before their terms began.

After the election the new board members met the responsiveness issue in several ways. They held the promised public meetings where citizens raised specific grievances such as over crowding in some schools. These meetings showed some support for a stronger board. For example, at one meeting members of the audience raised the idea of a paid staff for the board. During these meetings the new board members also revealed that they perceived their role in a new way for that system. When the idea of a paid staff was suggested, they said they had already begun planning for one. A winning candidate announced that he had already hired, at his own expense, an assistant to help with board related work. In the past, board members had stated that such a staff was not only unnecessary and expensive but also an indicant of lack of confidence in the superintendent.

Upon taking office, the new board members initiated policies to facilitate public communication with the board by relaxing the procedures for

addressing the board and setting time for an "open forum" at the end of board meetings. When the board room could not accommodate crowds, they moved to a larger auditorium. These changes conformed to the public relations definition of responsiveness. While they seem innocuous, the former board had been unwilling to make them.

The new board members also quickly established themselves as a force independent of the administration and the remaining incumbents who had supported them during the campaign. They signalled their position with symbolic gestures such as initiating a formal installation ceremony in which a judge administered the oath of office and demanding special stationery and designated parking spaces. They also argued with the superintendent and other board members over substantive issues. The first controversy developed over their response to another campaign issue--the effectiveness of the school system's large administrative staff. The new majority approved an expensive study of the organization of that staff and its impact on instruction. The minority vigorously opposed this decision.

Within three months the new majority felt that the superintendent would not implement their policies aggressively, so they attempted to reassign him within the system. Instead, he resigned. This precipitated widespread criticism of the "new kids on the block" which was especially vehement among those who had supported the two winning candidates during the campaign. Some former supporters bitterly noted that the new board members were initiating the policies of their opponents and abandoning the stance they had maintained before the election.

The conflict about school board policies and procedures before and during the campaign directly affected the new majority's decisions. Con-

flict, interacting with other factors, enabled the new board members to assume and maintain a posture independent of the school system's administration.

Kerr[19] argues that the absense of visible constituencies and candidates' lack of familiarity with school board activities and school programs makes new board members especially vulnerable to the socialization efforts of the school administration and other board members. This socialization ensures the perpetuation of a board controlled by the superintendent. The conditions Kerr describes had characterized the board until the 1977 election. A relatively closed system had determined educational policy.

The winning candidates were members of this system and had been endorsed by its leadership. The insurgents' failure to attract outsiders with their issues and candidates suggests that this endorsement was a major influence on the election's outcome. However, a combination of factors freed the winning candidates of a sense of obligation or a need to be accountable to these supporters.

Two electoral variables--self selection of candidates and at-large rather than districted positions--help explain the candidates' ability to establish a position independent of their supporters on the board and in the school administration. Cistone[20] found that board candidates in urban/heterogeneous areas are less likely to be recruited by others and less likely to be sponsored by incumbents than candidates in rural/homogeneous districts. In more complex settings the school board is less able to maintain a completely closed system by controlling the recruitment process for membership. Although the incumbents strongly supported the two winning candidates in this case, they did not recruit them. Rather, they waited

to see who chose to run, then evaluated the field and chose the most compatible candidates. As a result the incumbents and administration became only one of many groups supporting the winners. The new board members felt little obligation to the incumbents and administration, and they were less amenable to their influence than sponsored candidates would have been.

Running for at-large rather than districted positions enabled the winners to argue that their support came from throughout the city. The system's consensual style promoted a campaign in which support was sought from many groups. Both winners ran well throughout the city, gaining respectable support even in precincts they lost. While neither teacher organization endorsed them, they received support and votes from many teachers.[21] As a result the winners could argue that they were accountable to all parts of the community, not only to their most prominent supporters. The large majorities each candidate received bolstered that claim. The winning candidates joined the board with a sense of holding a popular mandate.

Two idiosyncratic variables, the presense of a dissident on the board and the expertise of one candidate, also helped the new board members assert their independence. The dissident owed her election to weather conditions rather than to broad community support. Although she had supported other candidates, she was willing to enter a coalition with the newcomers. Thus, from the beginning, the new board members had a majority vote. This freed them from domination by other board members.

One of the candidates came to the board with considerable expertise and experience. A former teacher in the system, she had spent many years as a community volunteer in the educational system. She also had served

on boards of other community organizations. This well informed and articulate woman was not intimidated by the experience of older board members and the expertise of the administration.

While electoral conflict and competition, self selection, and the nature of the candidates themselves explain the change in the board's decision making style and the removal of the superintendent, the most important condition is the complexity of the school district. It is more difficult for a professionally controlled elite to maintain a closed system in a complex setting than in a homogeneous community. The more diverse the district, the more difficult it is for the system to satisfy the demands different groups place upon it. In attempting to meet the demands of one group, the system meets resistance from others. Even the relatively small elite of community affairs activists who are involved in education are more likely to have diverse values and to make conflicting demands on the educational system. Complexity promotes conflict.

Complexity also promotes competition for office and increases the probability of electing a board member whose values diverge from those of the rest of the board. Cistone states that rural/homogeneous districts exhibit a more personal style of politics which discourages competition for office. However, in urban/heterogeneous districts the political and non-political benefits of office seeking and the variety of potential supporters encourages both self recruitment for candidacy and electoral competition.[22] Newly elected candidates are more likely to find allies on the board under such conditions. The more important variables identified in this case--conflict over issues, competition for office, and self selection of candidates--are more likely to occur in the complex setting than in the homogeneous community.

Zeigler and Jennings argue that the electoral process rarely conforms to the criteria of democratic theory of leadership selection. They state that limited competition, the widespread condition of sponsorship and preemptive appointments, infrequency of challenge to the status quo, and lack of definate educational issues typical of school board elections causes them to be discriminatory toward most of the community.[23] This case suggests that the absense of those conditions does not guarantee that the community as a whole will involve itself in educational politics. However, the event of the election itself may serve as a catalyst to change the relationship between the board and administration.

Whether the changed relationship is evidence of the board's attempt to be more responsive to the community or of democratic control of school policy is questionable. Instead it may signal a shift in control within the social system of activists in school policy. A segment of that system lost control and faced a condition of competition. Instead of public consensus, board meetings experienced open debate, conflict, and shifting coalitions determined by issues. Control had not shifted to a stable group when data collection ceased several months after the election.

## SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This case study provides evidence supporting the theory linking the complexity of a school district with electoral competition and with a decision making style marked by open conflict on the board and between the board and the superintendent. It also suggests that the effect of the electoral factors of competion and conflict are often indirect. In the election studied, conflict and competition helped the winning candidates

resist socialization pressures and maintain an independent posture rather than increasing turnout and developing identifiable constituencies to whom they felt accountable.

The case also shows the importance of idiosyncratic or chance variables in determining outcomes. While the variables identified in the theory increase the probability of conflict, idiosyncratic factors may make it happen. In this case the unpredictable election of a dissident in the last election, the fact that two seats rather than one were filled in the election, and the personal qualities of one of the winning candidates created a coalition with a majority vote on the board. In the absense of these factors, the election probably would not have changed the relationship between the superintendent and the majority of the board.

Finally, it appears that the relationships the theory identifies may not necessarily represent democratic influence on policy formation. While the board's decision style may appear more responsive, the board still cannot respond easily to the expressed demands of their constituents. Even within the small educational social system, grievances are varied, and their solutions are often in mutual conflict. When faced with constant criticism from one part or another of the community, the new board over time may retreat from its expressed posture of responsiveness and close ranks with the administration.[24]

FOOTNOTES

[1]The most extensive study of variables affecting school board behavior is: Harmon Zeigler and M. Kent Jennings (with G. Wayne Peake), Governing American Schools (North Scituate, Mass.: Duxbury Press, 1974).

[2]Zeigler and Jennings, Governing American Schools, pp. 80, 90, 167-171.

[3]David Minar, "Educational Decision Making in Suburban Communities," in Michael Kirst (Ed.), The Politics of Education at the Local, State and Federal Levels (Berkeley, California: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1970), pp. 167-182.

[4]Zeigler and Jennings, Governing American Schools, pp. 80, 167-171.

[5]Minar, "Educational Decision Making . . .".

[6]Peter Cistone, "The Ecological Basis of School Board Member Recruitment," Education and Urban Society 6 (August, 1974), 428-450.

[7]Zeigler and Jennings, Governing American Schools, p. 171.

[8]Leigh Stelzer, "School Board Receptivity," Education and Urban Society 5 (November, 1972), 69-90.

[9]Zeigler and Jennings, Governing American Schools, p. 90.

[10]Laurence Iannaccone and Frank Lutz, Politics, Power and Policy (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1970), pp. 85-88.

[11]Eugene LeDoux and Martin Burlingame, "The Iannaccone-Lutz Model of School Board Change: A Replication in New Mexico," Educational Administration Quarterly 11 (Winter, 1975), 72-78.

[12]Norman Kerr (Pseud.), "The School Board as an Agency of Legitimation," in Alan Rosenthal (Ed.), Governing Education (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1969), pp. 137-172.

[13]Zeigler and Jennings, Governing American Schools, p. 92.

[14]Philip Piele and John Hall, Budgets, Bonds, and Ballots (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1973), pp. 63-69.

[15]Both incumbents reportedly had decided to retire before the community conflicts arose. Thus it may not be possible to argue that their failure to seek reelection was a result of those political conditions as posited by Douglas E. Mitchell and Richard R. Thorsted, "Incumbent School Board Member Defeat Reconsidered: New Evidence for its Political Meaning," Educational Administration Quarterly 12 (Fall, 1976), 31-48.

[16]Richard V. Hatley, "Family Income, Voting Behavior, and Financial Referendums: Educational Finance and Politics in Albuquerque, 1968-1969," Unpublished Ed.D. dissertation, The University of New Mexico, 1970.

[17]Robert A. Dahl, "Who Governs," in Willis Hawley and Frederick Wirt (Eds.), The Search for Community Power (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969), pp. 93-114.

[18]Gloria Mallory, A Citizen Opinion Survey: How Albuquerqueans Feel About Their City (Albuquerque, New Mexico: The Albuquerque Urban Observatory, 1976).

[19]Kerr, "The School Board as an Agency of Legitimation."

[20]Cistone, "The Ecological Basis of School Board Member Recruitment."

[21]Voting information is taken from teacher responses to the questionnaires. Because a large proportion of the sample (37%) refused to state the choice of candidates, differences among groups were difficult to assess.

[22]Cistone, "The Ecological Basis of School Board Member Recruitment."

[23]Zeigler and Jennings, Governing American Schools, pp. 244-245.

[24]Kerr, "The School Board as an Agency of Legitimation," pp. 164-166, describes the attitude of alienation from the community in the boards he studied and suggests the development of this perspective is highly probable in other communities.